DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 374 771 IR 016 809

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TITLE Come Back Martin, A Lot of Stuff Is Forgiven: Philosophy of Technology and Philosophy of Education.
PUB DATE Apr 94
NOTE 21p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association (New Orleans, LA, April 4-8, 1994).
PUB TYPE Viewpoints (Opinion/Position Papers, Essays, etc.) (120) -- Speeches/Conference Papers (150)

EDRS PRICE MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS Change; Conservatism; Democracy; *Educational Philosophy; Educational Principles; Educational Theories; Ethics; Liberalism; Modernism; *Politics; Science and Society; Technology
IDENTIFIERS 1960s; Historical Background; Postmodernism

ABSTRACT

It is the thesis of this work that the intellectual and social movements of the sixties beyond conservatism, classical liberalism, new liberalism, and various versions of Left philosophy have generated a space for the construction of a neoteric philosophy. The neoteric influence of today's reality points out that philosophy must move beyond postmodernism and conservatism. This essay argues for a neoteric philosophy of education. Neotericism asserts that politics is not reducible to epistemology, economics, class, modes of production, or life-worlds. It is the rate change--a dynamic, not a structure--that is the central factor of modernity. It reasserts that the new liberal claim that community is the core topic of all politics is correct. A neoteric philosophy of education revolves around the reestablishment of democracy, community, civic humanism, and freedom in discussions of political philosophy in particular in a tone that is against fragmentation. (Contains 38 references.) (Author)

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Come back Martin, a Lot of Stuff is Forgiven. Philosophy of Technology and Philosophy of Education

by James S. Kaminsky

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Come back, Martin, a Lot of Stuff Is Forgiven: Philosophy of Technology and Philosophy of Education

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Abstract

It is the thesis of this work that the intellectual and social movements of the sixties beyond conservatism, classical liberalism, new liberalism, and various versions of Left philosophy have generated a space for the construction of a neoteric philosophy. The neoteric influence of today's reality points out that philosophy must move beyond post-modernism and conservatism.

This essay argues for a neoteric philosophy of education. Neotericism assets that politics is not reducible to epistemology, economics, class, modes of production, or life-worlds. It is the rate change—a dynamic, not a structure—that is the central factor of modernity.

It reasserts the new liberal claim that community is the core topic of all politics is correct. A neoteric philosophy of education revolves around the re-establishment of democracy,[1] community,[2] civic humanism,[3] and freedom[4] in discussions of political philosophy in general and educational philosophy in particular in a tone that is against fragmentation.

Introduction

This papers sketches a preface to a neoteric philosophy of education. It is an attempt to salvage miscellaneous threads of classical liberal theory that present themselves in American thought as the core of conservative political and social philosophy and meld them with the social democratic transformation of classic liberalism that presented itself as Progressivism in turn-of-the-century America and play the argument out against the

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intellectual heritage of modernism. It assumes, of course, that the various versions of conservative, liberal and Left philosophy now prevalent in the literature of educational philosophy are unequal to the tasks required of education in a neoteric age.

Neotericism

In one sense, neoteric educational philosophy is an attempt to return to the core project of the new liberalism of the 1890s to restore some intellectual vitality to the debates of educational philosophy which now seem stuck in a repetitive dialogue. The substance of new liberalism is directed at resolving the conflict between individual interest, the core of conservative thought and the quest for a common social good, the core of social democratic thought. "(New liberals) argued that the new world of interdependence and their new ideas of individuality and responsibility rendered prevailing political concepts obsolete, and they explored new ways of thinking about the role of the state appropriate to a radically different social reality and radically different ideas about man" (Kloppenberg 1986, 170). This essay argues a similar case. With the contemporary retreat of genuine conservatism into a reactionary right-wing politics, the political quiescence of new liberalism, and the collapse of Left and post-modernism; the construction of neoteric educational philosophy seems a more compelling project than it once did.

New Liberalism—1890s to World War II

In the 1890s a dramatic transition in the Western intellectual ethos occurred. Science replaced metaphysics as the primary means of explaining reality and social science challenged social and moral philosophy as the principal device for explaining human behavior. These developments generated a democratic philosophy that demanded not only fair play and social justice within the realm of politics, economics, and society itself, but a re-establishment of the sense of community that had been lost in the transition from agriculture to industry (see, Owen, 1818; Bellamy, [1887] 1926; Thoreau 1863, [1863] 1866, [1849] 1866).

Aristocratic versions of Victorian liberalism (self-interest) started to collapse in the 1890s under the pressure of social reform movements and utopian, socialist,

transcendental thought. The American intellectual establishment abandoned epistemology for history and exchanged "ultimate ends" for "proximal reforms" (see Kloppenberg 1986, 6). Populists and Progressives fashioned a new version of liberalism that stood somewhere between Victorianism's conservative ethos and the politics of various Left and radical utilitarian philosophies. It, this new version of liberalism, Progressives

> adapted new ideas about knowledge and responsibility to the new world of organized capitalism . . . (New liberals) contended that individual experience, conceived as radically social and unavoidably uncertain, provides the only basis for knowledge. They also emphasized the importance of history as a source of judgment, and they insisted that ideas must be tested in practice. . . (T)hese thinkers bleached the apocalyptic vibrancy from socialism and dyed their ideas in the softer shades of reform. . . In short, they wanted to extend the democratic principles of participation and equality from the civil and political spheres to the entire society and the economy, to accomplish without revolution the transformation from liberal democracy to social democracy. (Kloppenberg 1986, 199)

Conservative Reawakening

Of course, even during its most influential period (1890 - 1935) Progressivism did not have the intellectual field to itself. Conservatives outlined an impressive social and intellectual stance drawing on the work of both John Locke and Edmund Burke. Domestic American adaptations of classical liberalism are best represented by the complex work of Federalists like James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and John Adams.

Civic humanism was part of the work of Madison, Jefferson, and Adams but it was lost against classical liberalism's obsessive concern for the protection of property (capital). In the name of the protection of property American conservatism became overly concerned with obedience to the requirements of possessive individualism and the service of vested political, social, and economic privilege. Conservatism limits political participation and discounts social justice in the name of self-interest such that it creates an adversarial class politics that is destructive of all industrial nation states. As Kirk ([1953] 1978, 3) notes

many slow and unthoughtful persons have given a certain inertia to the idea of conservatism just as humble individuals overly enamored of prejudice and prescription have contributed to conservatism's bad name among social reformers of all political persuasions.

Neoteric democrats reject conservative philosophies and their contention that unlimited control of property is the most efficient, effective, or desirable solution to questions of social development, although they recognize the political, economic, and social power of property. Neoteric democrats believe that conservative laissez-faire politics can only be accomplished at the cost of the civic humanism that is necessary to keep mass society from flying apart. In other words, Neoterics are not interested in serving the prejudice and prescription of a conservative aristocracy.

Modernism

The American version of European modernism is marked by its technological fetish, its experimental style, and its preoccupation with change. Modernism amended the philosophical assumptions of American conservative, classical liberal, new liberal and social democratic thought.

> European modernism first of all stressed the disruptions and discontinuities of modernity which affected time, space, and sound. Evolving out of an evolutionary paradigm based on Darwinian biology, modernists attacked linearity as conveying a false order to the experience of life . . . Given a choice, they preferred anarchism over socialism, elitism over collectivism. While American modernism certainly had a few roots in romanticism, the place of first importance must go to the rebellion which the talented young felt against this newly oppressive bourgeois democracy . . . Modernism became a larger rubric that subsumed such philosophical terms as relativism and pragmatism, and such scientific terms as relativity and the uncertainty principle. (Crunden 1993, xii)

American modernists such as William James, Henry James, Ezra Pound, Alfred Stieglitz, Mabel Dodge, and others cast their lot with America's outsiders. "They were a collection of the excluded: they were Southern in a Yankee society, Jewish in a Christian society, black in a white society, Catholic in a Protestant society, female in a male society, or homosexual in a heterosexual society." (Crunden 1993, xiii). Although semi-formally excluded from the mainstream of American culture, they had little desire to participate in any revolutionary undoing of the country. They protested their lot with bohemian dress, ideas, and practices. They were literary outlaws, sexual libertarians, and social eccentrics.

The culture they produced was enthralled with change. The locomotive was its symbol, Art Nouveau its style; Henry Miller, Anaïs Nin, John Steinbeck, Upton Sinclair, and Jack London were its authors; John Dewey was its philosopher, and his version of Pragmatism was its philosophy; and, of course, Herbert Spencer's rendering of evolution was its theory of change. They were the first members of America's new intellectual class. It was a class that crafted its own symbols, found its own literary voice, and wrote its own philosophy. This group declared Europe fashionable, but passé. They announced the possibility of America.

Their work suggested a culture for America that was outside of, though not without reference to, its European heritage. David, a character in Israel Zangwill's play the *Melting Pot* (1909), first produced at the Columbia Theater, Washington in October of 1908 expressed the former in this dramatic manner:

> America is God's Crucible, the great Melting-Pot where all the races of Europe are melting and re-forming! Here you stand, good folk, think I, when I see them at Ellis Island, here you stand in your fifty groups, with your fifty languages and histories, and your fifty blood hatreds and rivalries. But you won't be long like that, brothers, for these are the fires of God you've come to—these are the fires of God. A fig for your feuds and vendettas! Germans and Frenchmen, Irishmen and Englishmen, Jews and Russians—into the Crucible with you all! God is making the American! (1909, 37)

The melting-pot became the ideology of American culture. American modernists declared the value of their own experience, their own literature, and their own philosophy.

Post-modernism

Neotericists do not believe that social or political goals can be drafted in terms of the utopian cultural transcendence required by Left philosophies. Although both the Frankfurt school in particular and post-modernism in general are profoundly revisionist and see Marxism or socialism as a starting point, not a norm of fidelity, and although both escape class as an a priori norm, their emphasis upon politically incorrect and problematic social, institutional, and personal reification present intellectual stances that are problematic. Neoterics reject the comfort of objective epistemology and metaphysics and are suspect of the exclusive social solidarity and class motives of revolutionary intellectual movements.

> The lack of any clear and plausible view of how a democratic socialist society might work is . . . the main obstacle to significant radical activity. State socialism in all its forms has been discredited. It has become increasingly difficult to put all the failure down to exogenous causes. The kinds of changes that *can* be produced by the use of centralized power are not the changes most socialists hoped for . . . (Burnheim 1985, 13)

Critical theorists and other post-modern intellectuals with more "traditional" forms of training, unlike the new technical and scientific elites who were the principal beneficiaries of the expanding capitalist market, are the principal beneficiaries of the expanding role of the civil service in state-type organizations. In this industrial world, critical theorists want a new politics "*through which*, first, state-expanding policies could be furthered and , second, *within which* a whole host of new "political" careers could be directly pursued by them" (Gouldner 1985, 180).

Not unmindful of post-modernists altruistic aspirations, neoterics suspect that the concern of post-modernists is a matter of their social aspiration, political impotence, and determination to pursue their own advantage. Neoterics also suspect that the post-modernists secretly despise the values and ends of both the dispossessed and the

establishment and "in the best of all possible worlds", would be their paternalistic supervisors, guardians, and teachers. Post-modernists assume as the university educated professional middle class does, that "All should be as they are" (Docker, 1988, 300).

> The professional middle class in modern history has always seen itself as the ethically superior class, the one group in society that does not, like traditional employing and working classes, pursue its own sectional interests, but which speaks to society and history's universal values, which indeed tries to create those values and live them out in its own life-styles and sensibility for the rest of society to follow. (Docker, 1988, 299)

Neoteric democrats reject post-modernism. They are no more interested in serving the interests of a social aristocracy than they are interested in serving the interests of a transcendent intellectual movement.

Democracy, Technics and Modernity

If the former is correct it is encumbent upon neoterics to assert their own voice. Neotericism finds its predicate in the modern connection of liberal democracy and technics. Jose Ortega Y Gasset (1932, 119) correctly noted that the modern period has two great elements: liberal democracy and technicism or, as you like it, mass man and the machine.[5] The idea and fact of "technics" as an attitude toward existence empowered by the equipment of reality it is a significant intellectual part of the tensions of the modern era. Technics is of interest here in that it runs in a reciprocating path between liberal, conservative, and Left thought and is a essential part of each. Because of technics' intimate association with the social, economic, political tensions of this age—liberal, conservative, and Left—the vocabularies of technics and democracy and their metaphors can be used to manipulate contemporary intellectual controversies to make some cognitive preparation for the future of society and education.[6]

Technics

Neoteric reality has been defined by techics.[7] Technics has defined the cognitive horizon of individuals just as it has defined modern society. It is no longer plausible to define

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reality in terms of economics, class, family structure, mode of economic production, and so on. Technics is the central factor in the determination of the cognitive horizon of modern society. It has transformed and enhanced the intellectual horizon of modern society. The availability of that horizon to each member of society and the terms upon which that horizon is available has been fundamentally modified by technology. The ability to handle and manipulate hot data streams using technics is elemental to modern cognitive horizons. Neoteric adaptivity is defined by the ability to tolerate and manage a hyper-elevated rate of change and instability, personal, social, political, and economic. The central characteristic of the this period is no longer structural; it is dynamic. It is a matter of technics. Technics is the superordinate identity of the modern period.

"Technique, moreover, creates a bond between men. All those who follow the same technique are bound together in a tacit fraternity and all of them take the same attitude toward reality" (Ellul 1965, 31). Technics is part of the matrix that tells us in a variety of obtrusive and unobtrusive ways what we may reasonably hope and expect for ourselves and others, just as it promotes and limits our relationships with reality in a variety of ways. Technics, however, is not self-sufficient. It is conditioned by a variety of factors—demographic, geographical, historical, economic, cultural, and so on. These factors create a certain irreducible diversity that is—depending upon the level of analysis—described as identity, personality, ethos, world-view, ethnicity, culture, and so on. Nevertheless, technology has transformed the terms of full participation in cultural, social, political, and economic systems. The possession of technical skill in general and possession of the technical skills to manage and manipulate hot symbolic data now has become a primary element in the definition of full social adulthood and full participation in any element of modern culture.

The ability to participate as a full political, social, and economic adulthood depends upon the ability to handle and manipulate hot data streams. For example, even the most primitive, and primary, element of democratic politics, voting, depends upon the use of rather large, if primitive, machine. Politics itself now takes places within information systems and electronic consensus testing. Full social majority and participation in society depends upon the ability to handle and manipulate hot data streams. At a very minimum full social adulthood presupposes sophisticated telephonic communication, electronic credit and cash-flow access, instant information access via electronic bulletin

boards of various descriptions, CD Rom computer drives and data transfer. Full cultural participation means everything from computer filing of income taxes, to electronic banking and investing services, at the very minimum.

Technology is a potent force. Technology *Enframes* reality. Technology as *Enframing* marks a different human stance toward existence. The fact is that *Enframing* defines reality and *modifies* humanity's relationship to itself and everything else (Heidegger [1954] 1977, 27). Technics, as a pattern of "whats" and "whos" (reality) conditions what we can say and discursively think. It helps determine reality and its prospects for each "who". It has fundamentally changed the interaction of social relations and the means of production. And, of course, it was technology that made revolution as a means of achieving social transformation increasingly unsavory and the possibility of reactionary political, social, and economic stability impossible. It was technics that ensured that reality would begin and end in the differential experience of reality and its proximal—as well as ultimate—uncertainty. In other words, neither the ends nor the means of reality can be defined in advance.

Science and technology are reciprocal activities (see Price 1965). The relationship of science to technology is not simple or linear. Technology and science are reciprocal historical events. Science did not point to technology nor did technology point to science; they pointed to each other (Price 1965).[8] Technology is a matter of the humanity's assumption of a contingent and material relationship to itself and to everything else (Heidegger [1954] 1977). Science and technology (initially little more than the systematic study of the world and a collection of rules of thumb) are an expression of humanity's appropriation of the attitude of intellectual confidence and courage. In practice their stance denied that the proximal universe was absurd and, with appropriate arrogance, deferred the question of absurdity as an ultimate state-of-affairs for another day, a mere technical question.

Technics is a fundamental dynamic that runs in a reciprocal relationship with significant social compositions like family, kinship, class; hunting and gathering, horticulture, agriculture, industry; anarchy, aristocracy, democracy; and so on. Technology, of course, is the attitude and device that gives each person the power of cultural transcendence. It is an orientation that is not neutral or socially amoral; it is a potent

orchestration of reality and norms of conduct. It dissolved the mysteries of objective ethics and presented for human consideration a range of earthly moralities that are based upon experience, grown out of personal and social dispositions, loyalties, and the determination to extend the realm of morals. It assumes an ongoing developmental discourse directed toward the possibility of human solidarity (Toulmin [1950] 1970). On the other hand, individuals that perceive their own plasticity and hold the means to alter their relationship to themselves and everything else institutionalize the possibility of modern social conflict and cultural fragmentation just as they hold the possibility of alternative realities and life-worlds.

Ethics and Education

Technology's attitude and utility generate the impulse, passion, and means to transcend culture—all codes moral, social, and material—and live the life of Zarathustra, the immoralist (cf., Gasset, 1932, 201) and Sisyphus, the rebel (cf., Camus 1956). The immoralist and the rebel are no longer bound by the limitations of time and history, he is its author and the author of himself. Having acquired science, the means to Nietzsche's will to power, humanity is admitted to life without limits. In a modern and post Fascist voice Camus reminds us that a life without limits generates its own nobility.

> Man's solidarity is founded upon rebellion, and rebellion, in its turn, can only find its justification in this solidarity . . .
>
> Metaphysical rebellion is the movement by which man protests against his condition and against the whole of creation. It is metaphysical because it contests the ends of man and of creation. The slave protests against the condition in which he finds himself within his state of slavery; the metaphysical rebel protests against the condition in which he finds himself as a man . . .
>
> When the throne of God is overturned, the rebel realizes that it is now his own responsibility to create the justice, order, and unity that he sought in vain within his own condition . . . ([1951] 1956, 22, 23, 25)

From this 'responsibility to create the justice, order, and unity' springs the rebel's obligation to create a just community that recognizes the dignity and worth of all individuals. The moral obligation for education is a function of the immoralist's determination "to create the justice, order, and unity that he sought in vain within his own condition . . . (Camus [1951] 1956, 22, 23, 25). It is part of the obligation to create justice, order and solidarity among the "kingdom of ends" as a methodological requirement of maximizing the "pool of all possibilities", in a reality that is indifferent to the prospects of any individual in particular and to the world in general.

Extending the Educational Debate

Neoteric philosophy chooses an alliance with social democracy and a version of regulated capitalism as the most likely context for maximizing the well-being of all members of the community among existing or plausible options.[9] That is, there seems to be sound historical merit in this choice; particularly in the absence of any credible and historically defensible alternative–royalist, anarchist, socialist, or communist. Again, the possibility of a neoteric philosophy depends upon settling "a fundamental disagreement over the just form of basic institutions within a democratic society under modern conditions" (Rawls 1980, 518), defining "the essential aspect of our conception of ourselves as moral persons and of our relation to society as free and equal citizens" (Rawls 1980, 520), and then articulating a reasoned study of educational philosophy consistent with these strategic ends (e.g., Dewey [1916] 1966). This effort assumes a reconnection of the study of education to a version of democratic politics that gives equal attention to both freedom (classical liberalism) and community (social democratic thought).

Education and Democracy

This preface—as both Heidegger ([1926] 1962, 262) and Wittgenstein (1958,109) remind us—must be careful not to confuse the linguistic problems of words with the problems of the world. "Nevertheless, the ultimate business of philosophy is to preserve the *force of the most elemental words* in which *Dasein* expresses itself, and to keep the common understanding from leveling them off to that unintelligibility which functions in turn as a source of pseudo-problems" (Heidegger ([1926] 1962, 262 italics in original).[10] Within the context of this view of philosophy the "most elemental" lines of this investigation should be useful to

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determine the intellectual position of our time and reveal at least hint as to how we might proceed in making intellectual preparations for the future of democracy and education (cf., Rorty 1989, 117).

Again, the origin of science and technology was part of the human resolution to abandon fear and bewilderment as the primeval and primitive emotion of humanity and embrace heroism and erudition (cf. Heidegger [1926] 1962, [340 - 346] 389 - 396). Collaterally, then, the origin of technology was a matter of *embracing* courage, adventure, and *taking* responsibility for the quality of existence (cf. Nietzsche [1891] 1960, sec. 15 On Science, 414). Under the influence of the ideology of the Age of Reason humanity abandoned the possibility of revealed omniscience, radically limited the reach of knowledge to the domain of natural, tied knowing to experience, and extended the role of consciousness in the architecture of experience.

Education, of course, is an assumption of the determination to abandon fear and bewilderment and embrace heroism and erudition. The education of all is a historical assumption of the two great elements of the modern period: liberal democracy and technicism or, as you like it, mass man and the machine. The philosophical assumption is that the well-being of humanity is best assured by maximizing the "pool of all possibilities", a Kantian assumption.

Insofar as neoteric philosophy of education is connected to new liberal theory, it rejects the traditional criticism that liberal theory turns a blind eye to social structures and dedicates itself—in a politically and socially unconscious manner—to the unwitting maintenance of social, political, and economic privilege and assumes that there are ancient and strong democratic assumptions in liberal theory that can be utilized to construct a neoteric philosophy. Shadowing the traditional post-modern criticism of liberal theory Jonathan writes this:

> The aim of education is the good of the individual, with its content and process designed to enable individuals to determine for themselves what that good shall be. It is a truism that what makes liberal education liberal is its proponents' agnosticism about the substance of its outcomes, though not of course about the procedural values which those outcomes should instantiate.

> This position has always involved the liberal educator in a precarious act of tightrope-walking, made possible by the implicit and unelaborated safety-net assumption that there is either a causal or a conceptual connection between critical reflection and sound judgment, and between sound judgement and moral value. The precariousness of walking this tightrope in practice, together with liberal educational theory's unwillingness to scrutinise too closely the intrinsic structure of the safety net, leaves philosophers of education returning again and again to check the twin pillars of individual development and personal autonomy between which the tightrope is strung. But as modernity's progressive fragmenting of value causes the tightrope to sway more and more violently, something more is required from us than careful maintenance of its fixings. (1993, 175)

Jonathan's criticism contains enough recognizable elements of liberal theory to give it a plausible form. Liberal theory, however, is not bereft of social and political agendas as the former implies. Liberal theory, characterized in the broadest form, requires that education to provide the infrastructure necessary for all individuals to have the opportunity to fully participate in the political, social, and economic institutions of the community. It is agnostic about ultimate means and ends and limits itself to proximal objectives. It maintains that the people should determine the good for themselves and should not be required to rely upon any elite to determine it for them.

The worst that can be said of liberal theory is that it has the modesty to refrain from declaring ultimate goals when none can be known. Liberal theory is agnostic about social, political, and economic ends but only to the extent that it assumes that final ends cannot be predetermined once and for all time. It confines itself to proximal means and ends and does reject the metaphysical comfort of final means and ends. Furthermore it is historically incorrect to argue that liberal educational theory is unwilling to examine the assumptions, presumptions, or consequences of social, political, or economic practice. Decades of social legislation, thousands of court cases, social movements of all descriptions—civil rights, feminist, religious, handicapped, ethnic, and so on—are evidence of a powerful transformational vector in liberal theory of all descriptions. The claim that liberal theory is transformation without change is just post-modernist rhetoric.

The characterization of liberal theory as unconscious and ineffectual is without support, except, perhaps, against the immaculate requirements of post-modern critical theory.

The strategic goal (proximal end) of neoteric educational philosophy is to build a modern democratic community in which *all* members of the community are full political, social, and economic members. Neoteric educational philosophy should address both aspects of this traditional social debate; that is, the use of education to generate a coherent program of social amelioration while paying a decent respect for the voluntarism of classical liberalism.[11] In addition, neoterics must avoid the attempt to phrase the connection of democracy and education as an unmitigated and precious commitment to simplistic pluralism (e.g., Putnam and Putnam 1993), they must resist understanding the philosophy as individual empowerment of classical liberalism—some "education of the whole person"—that safely isolates educational philosophy from the social and political context of education's practice (e.g., Rosenthal 1993), and finally, they must not confuse the questions of education with those of philosophy (e.g., Lynch 1993).

The task for educational philosophers is to find the intellectual bench marks of democracy's words and preserve their force, such that existing formulations of educational theory do not diminish or eliminate educational philosophy's ability to satisfy the demand of American publics to foreshorten the distance between contemporary democratic expectations and educational practice. Again, as Rorty (1989, 50) notes the most philosophers can do in their writing is to attempt to manipulate the intellectual tensions of their epoch so as to make some cognitive preparation for the future.

Neoteric Educational Philosophy

Neoteric philosophy of education must escape its modernist ethos, its collectivist mediocrity, and its conservative inertia. In the first chapter of *Democracy and Education*, Dewey described the fundamental predicate of education as an absence of cognitive survival skills among neonates. His stance is suggestive but misleading. The fundamental predicate for education is the human refusal to accept its condition as given in existence and its determination to define its own situation in human terms.

Within this egocentric voluntaristic matrix, the role of education is to transfer access and possession of a technically *Enframed* reality to all members of the community as a prerequisite for participation in the human project, the project of defining themselves and their world.[12] Access and possession of a technically *Enframed* reality is axiomatic to the liberty of each person to engage in their own project.

Dewey further specified "community" as a primary educational criteria in a more social tone. Without community the human project would be without stability or means and would devolve into fragmentation, nihilism, and anarchy. He realized that a sense of community in which the purposes and goals of *all individuals* are structurally supported by the culture and are granted a decent respect by all is a requirement of the human project in general.[13] Long before John Dewey, Thomas Hobbes correctly noted that:

> Whatsoever, therefore, is consequent to a time of war where every man is enemy to every man, the same is consequent to the time wherein men live without other security than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and, which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. (Hobbes [1651] 1958, 107)

Community maintains the possibility of, and a structural solidarity with, a variety of life-worlds and life-projects. All social matrixes assume community. Cultural traditions and agreements political, social, and economic are tools for the creation of human projects. The success of those projects, furthermore, depends upon the invention, maintenance, and development of those tools, and the abandonment of tools no longer equal to the requirements of contemporary human projects. The construction of community as both conservatives and social democrats have noticed is prior to the possibility of civil society.

Conclusion

Education holds the obligation and responsibility to extend access and possession of the cultural matrix indispensable to the will to power—the refusal to accept the human condition as it is found in existence—and community. The obligation of the school in this case is faced with a delicate judicial act. Education is morally obligated to the realization of the two great human projects, one personal and the other communal. Its instructional obligation is consequentially tied to the general proximal effort of everyperson to create themselves and satisfy their own project just as it is reciprocally tied to the numerous life-worlds of community as a prerequisite of complex social organizations of any form. The binary task of education is thus, the creation of justice, order, and solidarity among the "kingdom of ends" as a methodological requirement of maximizing the "pool of all possibilities" and, thereby, community and civil society.

Endnotes

[1]Democracy in this context extends well beyond the political realm. It means the opportunity for full political, social, economic participation for all members of the group in all aspects of the group's various life-worlds.

[2]For the purpose of this essay I take community to be an assemblage of persons who participate one with another for the purpose of accomplishing various activities and aims. This interaction is conducted with a view to assuring the opportunity for full political, social, economic participation for all members of the group in all aspects of the group's various life-worlds. In a real community, this interaction in pursuit of a common end must be conducted with reference to, and a decent respect for, the situation of individuals, their purposes and goals, life-worlds, and intellectual dispositions (Dewey 1916, 5). Furthermore, the accomplishment of the general community goal cannot be conducted outside of the limits of that would offend the standards of rational consent (see Rawls [1971] 1972).

[3]I take civic humanism to mean the following, "the essential aspect of our conception of ourselves as moral persons and of our relation to society as free and equal citizens" (Rawls 1980, 520),

[4]Freedom has to do with both the absence of restraint and the empowerment of individuals so as to allow them the opportunity of accomplishing thier own projects.

[5]The difference is nothing more than a matter of the point's rhetorical tone.

[6]This essay uses the idea of technology as one paradigm of humanity to move beyond the crippled debate that seems to be going nowhere but still exists between liberals and conservatives (cf. Rorty 1989, 51). Of course this task is constructed at the cost of recognizing that the justification of neo-liberal society and its educational system is a

matter of comparative frutifulness. It can no longer be justified by reference to its philosophical foundations alone. As previously mentioned, it is not permissible to judge philosophical or critical systems by their aspirations and real judgments and real justifications must be made in terms of their real personal and social consequences.

One purpose of this preface is an attempt to overcome contemporary Left, liberal, and conservative authority for the purpose of crafting a new authority to assist schools in making some preparation for the future without claiming some special authority for the new class (cf., Rorty 1989, 105). This is precisely the activity, of course, for which John Dewey was roundly criticized by radicals and conservatives alike. It was his attempt to get people to "change their minds" as a first step in social reform for which the Left censured him. They criticized him for this "ignorance" of the importance of structural reform in social change. Conservatives on the other hand condemned him for suggesting people fill their minds with social democratic twattle when he should have been singing the virtues of a laissez-faire economy.

The trick here is to remember the epistemological, social, and political debates of socialists, liberals, and conservatives and move on to other questions without starting it up again in another voice and then thinking that it is somehow all different.

[7]Technics is the two parallel worlds of technology of science and their interaction. They are two independent but related worlds. One begins in the repudiation of ignorance and a collateral quest to know and the other begins in the unwillingness to accept humanity's condition as found in the world and in the collateral determination to manipulate and define the reality in human terms.

[8]For example, the study of astronomy generated the geometric and mathematical tools that made the invention of the telescope possible while the use of the telescope made the extension of mathematical and theoretical astronomy possible.

[9]Thus, in one sense, it could be argued that neoteric philosophy opts for assumptions that are Western or perhaps, merely American, culture-bound, ethnocentric, and, perhaps, little more than comfortable, familiar, and imperfect (cf., Burheim 1985). Nonetheless, a reliance uopon historical evidence seems a necessary risk unless one finds more social comfort in the proofs of rigorous rationality and logical demonstrations.

[10]*Dasein*: Being-there.

[11]After this point I will use the more generic and less restrictive term individualism to refer to the more technical concerns of voluntarism that are found in classical liberal philosophy.

[12]Unlike Nietzsche([1891] 1960) who reserved acquisition of the "will to power" to those who could follow in the path of Zarathustra, Dewey assumed that each individual and the community will be best served if the instrumental abilities necessary for full participation in the political, social, cultural, and economic institutions are not reserved for the few but, rather, are shared with all. In a more profound sense Dewey noted that the possession of technically *Enframed* reality was fundamental to becoming one's own project.

[13]In another sense and in a philosophically more profound voice, Dewey's selection of community as "the" criteria of education reflects the pervasive presence of Kantian constructivism in Western moral thought (see, Rawls 1980).

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